When players with different interests try to achieve a better state, conflicts among players arise. Conflicts may arise also among public players. For example, a local government may insist on the interest of the region while the national government represents the interests of the whole country.
I. INTRODUCTION
F RASER and Hipel [1] proposed conflict analysis based on metagame theory [2] . Conflict analysis defines stability of states and specifies stable states. Nash equilibrium in game theory is one of the concepts of stability. Fang et al. [3] extended the methodology and proposed graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR). In GMCR, agents' moves between states are extended to include common and irreversible moves.
In order to analyze the stability of states, it is critical to know the preferences of players. However, it is often difficult to obtain complete information. That is why minimum conditions for stability should be specified before the inspection of preferences. Okada et al. [4] proposed robustness analysis to identify the minimum conditions on players' preferences in the 2-player conflicts where one player's preference is not known to another player. On the other hand, the third party may not have enough information on both players' preferences.
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Publisher Item Identifier S 1094-6977(02)04678-3. ences are not known each other. In Section II, GMCR is extended for the cases with incomplete preference information.
In Section III, generalized robustness analysis is proposed. In Section IV, the methodology of robustness analysis is applied to the conflict on water resources development.
II. GRAPH MODEL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

A. Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR)
Fang et al. [3] proposed the GMCR as the representation of conflicts among players. Let be the set of players and be the set of states of the conflict. We also define -tuple as the set of directed graphs that . The set of arcs means player s possible move between states. Let be the arc from the state to the state . If , player can move from the state to the state unilaterally. We also need to define the payoff function :
( : the set of real numbers). Payoff function determines players' evaluations of the state in , and specifies players' preference orders. If is larger than , player prefers the state to the state . GMCR is represented by 4-tuple , where , , , and . Fig. 1 shows both strategic form and graph form of the "prisoner's dilemma." In this case, , and , , respectively. The following are other definitions used in GMCR. Compared with strategic form, the major advantage of graph form is that it can represent common and irreversible moves. The definitions of common and irreversible moves are as follows.
Definition:
• The move is common move if and for and . • The move is irreversible move if and for . In strategic form, states are defined as the combination of players' strategies. As a result, the move between two states is possible only when one player changes its strategy. However, in real conflicts, plural players may be able to move to the same states, and the choice such as "nuclear attack" in military conflicts, leads a conflict to the irreversible result, which cannot be returned. GMCR can incorporate common and irreversible moves into the model. Fig. 2 shows the game on the formulation of cooperation between two players. The difference from prisoner's dilemma in Fig. 1 is the existence of common and irreversible moves from the state 4 to the state 1. It is assumed that both players have two alternatives, "collaborate" and "not collaborate" in strategic form. To realize cooperation, both players need to take the alternative "collaborate." However, cooperation collapses even if one player changes its alternative from "collaborate" to "not collaborate." Once cooperation is collapsed by the common move, players cannot return the same path to cooperative state directly. They have to change their strategies one by one again.
B. Definition of Stability and Equilibrium in Two-Player Conflict
Based on Fang et al. [3] , some definitions on stability are shown as follows. Here we assume a 2-player game. The fol-lowing are the solution concepts used in graph model for conflict [3] .
• Nash Stability The state is Nash stable for player if, and only if, cannot improve its payoff by changing his own strategies. In other words, . • Sequential Stability [4] The state is sequentially stable for player if, and only if, for every , there exists with . (Here, is called the sanction for player s UI, .)
The state is general metarational for player if, and only if, for every , there exists with .
We use these solution concepts also in the following robustness analysis.
C. Extension of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution for the Case With Incomplete Preference Information
Potential users of GMCR are players themselves, consultants advising players, third parties analyzing conflicts, mediator, etc. (Fang et al. [3] ). Let us call such users "analysts." In some cases, an analyst does not have complete information on players' preferences. When one player is an analyst, it may not know about its counterparts' preferences. Consultants, third parties, or mediator may have only limited information on all players' preferences.
Before presenting the GMCR with incomplete information, we introduce a binary description for representing ordinal preference.
means that player (strictly) prefers to , and means that player strictly or equally prefers to . On the other hand, means that and are indifferent for player .
Let the pattern of players' preference orders and the set of patterns be and , respectively. When states are strictly ordered (there are no indifferent states), the number of each player's preference orders amounts to . Consequently, the number of patterns of players' preference orders becomes and . If an analyst has complete information, it can recognize exactly. However, if an analyst has only limited knowledge, it only recognizes that the pattern of preference orders is included in the subset of . Let be the subset of representing an analyst's knowledge on players' preferences. Although an analyst knows that the true pattern of preference orders is certainly included in the set , it does not know which is a true pattern in .
Using information set , we propose GMCR with incomplete information. GMCR under analyst's information set is represented by 4-tuple , where , ,
, and . When is a singleton set, an analyst has complete information.
Here we define the sets that represent analyst's knowledge on preferences. Ordered sets on analyst's information set [ , ,
, and ]:
• The state belongs to if is preferred to by player at every pattern of preference orders in information set ( ).
• The state belongs to
if is equally preferred to by player at every pattern of preference orders in information set ( ). • The state belongs to if is less preferred to by player at every pattern of preference orders in information set ( ). • The state belongs to if does not belong to either , , or . In other words, an analyst does not know if player prefers to or not with information set . The product of reachable list and ordered set is defined as "ordered reachable list." That is
When is a singleton set, and .
D. Stability in GMCR With Incomplete Information
Even if the information on players' preferences is incomplete for the analyst, stability analysis for some states can be carried out. For 2-player conflict, definitions for Nash stability, sequential stability, and GMR based on analyst's knowledge can be shown as follows.
Nash Stability Based on Analyst's Knowledge: The state is Nash stable for player based on analyst's information set if, and only if, the following condition is satisfied:
Sequential Stability Based on Analyst's Knowledge:
The state is sequentially stable for player based on analyst's knowledge if, and only if, the following condition is satisfied:
General Metarationality Based on Analyst's Knowledge: The state is general metarational for player based on analyst's knowledge if the following condition is satisfied:
Nash stability is decided without any information on other player's preference. If a player does not have any UIs, the state is Nash stable for the player. On the other hand, sequential stability and GMR depends on the player's knowledge on its counterpart's preference. If a player knows that its counterpart has a UI (in sequential stability) that reduces its payoff, the player gives up moving from the current state.
In the next section, robustness analysis that specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of states is shown.
III. GENERALIZATION OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
A. Robustness Analysis
Stability analysis in conflict analysis decides if the corresponding state is stable or not, based on the solution concepts. However, if an analyst does not know players' preferences, it cannot judge the stability of the state.
In the actual situation, an analyst does not necessarily have the complete information at the beginning of the analysis. Therefore, when an analyst needs to know about the stability, it has to collect information and renew its knowledge. Okada et al. [4] proposed robustness analysis to specify the minimum conditions that is necessary to judge the stability of the corresponding state. robustness analysis is a kind of an inverse problem of stability analysis.
Okada et al. [4] proposed robustness analysis for 2-player conflict in which the preference of one player is not known. In this paper, we generalize the methodology to apply 2-player conflict under arbitrary information set of an analyst. The generalized robustness analysis can be applied to the conflict where both players' preferences are not known. Analysts can use the result of robustness analysis as follows.
Players: Although a player knows its own preference, it may not have enough information on its counterpart's preference. Robustness analysis can provide the minimum information guaranteeing that a state can become a resolution of a conflict.
Mediator: Mediator tries to find the state that can be accepted as a compromise by both players. The stable state has high possibility to be accepted by players. However, in many cases, mediator has incomplete information on both players' preferences. If a mediator can confirm the condition for stability that is shown by robustness analysis, it can present the state as a proposal for agreement with conviction.
In the following parts, robustness analysis is generalized.
B. The Conditions for Stability in 2-Player Conflicts
Here we show the conditions that are necessary for the third party to judge if the corresponding state is stable or not. Since these conditions are specified based on the third party's knowledge, the information sets on the third party's knowledge are used. The sufficient condition for stability of a state is represented by some inequalities on players' preference. We call the set of these conditions "condition set." In the following subsection, conditions for Nash stability, sequential stability, and GMR are formulated.
1) The Condition for Nash Stability: The state is Nash stable for player if the UI from state by player is empty set [ ].
In GMCR under the information set , is the subset of , and is included in (see Fig. 3 ). Consequently, the condition that the state is Nash stable for player is shown as follows.
(Presumption) : For every (8) Fig. 3 . Relationship between sets.
The number of conditions included in a sufficient condition set becomes . The number of sufficient condition sets for player is one.
2) The Condition for Sequential Stability: The stake is sequentially stable for player if sanction exists for every state included in . Since is the subset of , the existence of sanction for player s movement to the state in is necessary to guarantee sequential stability of the stake . That is • For every and (9)
Here, if , and if . or is the condition that player does not move to the state which is known as UI for player .
For the state in , it is not known if a state is included in or not. If an analyst obtains information that shows that player prefers to the state in , it needs to find information showing existence of sanction. The flowchart for specifying conditions is shown in Fig. 4 and in the following inequalities.
• For every (11) and
is the condition that is not UI for player . and are the condition for the existence of the sanction for . The condition for sequential stability of the state includes one of or for every and -for every .
3) The Condition for General Metarationality: In the case of GMR, the condition for the existence of sanction is not necessary. Therefore, we need to assume a very conservative player when we use the solution concept of GMR. If , can always be found. In case of the states in , the process for checking possibility of player s move is similar to the process for sequential stability. First, an analyst checks if player prefers to the state in . If an analyst obtains information that shows that player prefers to the state in , it needs to find the information showing existence of sanction (see Fig. 5 ).
• For every ,
If , can always be found. The sets of Nash stable states and sequentially stable state are the subsets of general metarational states [3] . Therefore, the conditions that the state is general metarational (14)-(16) are the necessary conditions for other solution concepts. That implies that the state which satisfies the conditions for Nash stability or sequential stability is more robust than the state which only satisfies the conditions for GMR.
C. Example of Robustness Analysis
As an example, robustness analysis for the conflict shown in Fig. 6 is carried out. Since there are four states in the conflict, . Let us assume that an analyst's information set consists of the following eight pairs of preference orders: and and and and and and and and (17)
Ordered sets and ordered reachable lists are shown as follows. Ordered Sets:
Let us think about the stability of the state B. Using the conditions shown in , the state B is stable if the following relationships are satisfied. 
When two conditions [(a) and (b)] exist, the state B is stable if at least one of the two conditions is satisfied. The result of robustness analysis shows that limited number of preference relationships needs to be specified to guarantee the stability of a state.
IV. APPLICATION OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
A. Planning Conflict
Environmental problem often involves conflicts between stakeholders. For example, Fang et al. [3] discuss the Garrison diversion unit conflict [5] , which involves the governments of the United States and Canada, the government of Manitoba, environmentalists, etc. In the conflicts on environment, the alternative for mediating interests on development and environment is necessary. Therefore, it is important to guarantee the stability of a state.
In this section, the methodology of robustness analysis is applied to the conflict on hydropower generation and a river environment [6]- [8] (Fig. 7) . There exist some reservoirs only for hydropower generation in a river basin. For the purpose of efficient use of potential energy, the water stored in reservoirs is often sent to the other reservoir directly. Bypassing water by pipelines may reduce a large amount of water downstream. That results in a shortage of river flow downstream. This shortage affects ecosystems, leisure, landscapes, sightseeing, and groundwater.
Several countermeasures (alternatives) to increase the flow of water are available. For example, local government can construct a new reservoir to obtain a storage capacity for environmental flow (see Fig. 8 ). In this case, local government can make a decision independently of existing user (hydropower generation). However, the resolution may result in an inefficient use of sites. Local government may not be able to find an appropriate site to construct an additional reservoir.
On the other hand, the power generation company may be able to reduce the level of hydropower generation (see Fig. 9 ). When this alternative is taken, the company has to generate elec- tricity by other means (other reservoirs, thermal power generation, etc.) If the scale of hydropower generation is reduced, the benefit to the power generation company is reduced. Therefore, the power generation company may ask the local government to compensate the loss. The transfer of benefit can be interpreted as net benefit reallocation of the project.
In this case, the power generation company represents the vested interests, while the local government represents the new interests of the river environment. A critical difference between them is that the power generation company (an existing user) can continue the hydropower generation in a status quo, while the local government cannot recover the river flow without taking any actions.
We assume two players. One is a local government and the other is a power generation company. In this conflict, the local government (Player 1) represents societal needs for better river environment. The purpose of the player is to conserve (or recover) the river environment by increasing discharge from a reservoir. We assume that the local government does not care about the benefit of a power generation company. The purpose of power generation company (Player 2) is to generate and sell electricity. Player 2 hopes to maintain the current level of hydropower generation. However, if it can achieve the cooperation with Player 1 (local government), it may have an incentive to change the current situation. Player 2's incentive depends on the net benefit which Player 2 can obtain.
Player 1 can maintain the status quo or construct a new reservoir by itself. These alternatives are called and , respectively. Player 2 has the alternative that it stays in the status quo. The alternative is called . Redevelopment solutions are not realized if at least one player takes these strategies.
We assume the case where several types of redevelopment solutions are assumed. Redevelopment solutions are represented by the combination of the alternatives on net benefit allocation and structural measures. This is assumed as follows.
1) Player 1 can select the alternatives on net benefit allocation. 2) Player 2 can select the alternatives on structural measures. Player 1's alternatives for redevelopment solutions ( ):
• Low payment level ( ).
• Medium payment level ( ). • High payment level ( ). Player 2's alternatives for redevelopment solutions ( ):
• Using other power generation means ( ).
• Adding hydropower generation in another reservoir ( ).
• Upgrading the dam ( ). Redevelopment solutions are represented by . The redevelopment solution indicates that Player 1 takes strategy on net benefit allocation and Player 2 takes strategy on structural measure.
In order to realize redevelopment solutions, both players have to take the strategies compensating the loss (Player 1) and changing the status quo (Player 2), respectively. However, if Player 1 gives up compensating and preferred noncooperative solution ( ), the state is moved from a cooperative solution ( ) to a noncooperative solution ( ). Similarly, if Player 2 gives up taking a structural measure for redevelopment, the state is moved from to S. On the other hand, the transition from to could not happen unilaterally. All of this shows that each player can cause the collapse of a cooperative solution unilaterally and the transition is an irreversible move.
Figs. 10 and 11 show and in the graph model for the planning conflict. The number of the feasible states is 20. The collapse of cooperation is represented by irreversible and common moves.
B. Information Structure in Planning Conflict
In this planning conflict, we assume the following information structure:
(30) Equation (30) reveals that temporary states are not preferred to the solutions which could become final solutions. We call , , and "real solutions." This information enables us to classify states into two groups. On the other hand, it is also obvious that both players prefer the states in which its own payment is lower. That is means Player 2s alternative).
(31) Using this information, we can make the order between these states. Table I shows the ordered sets , , and in the planning conflict.
C. Players' Preferences and Social Efficiency
As regards players' preferences, the following relationships exist.
• Table II shows the conditions that state (Player 1 pays the cost at medium level and uses other power generation means) is Nash stable or sequentially stable for Player 1 (A) and Player 2 (B). The inequalities in Table II are the condition sets which the planning authority has to detect to confirm that is a stable renewal alternative. From , Player 1 can always move to low payment level. In other words, it is common knowledge that Player 1 has a UI from to . Therefore, it is obvious that is not Nash stable for Player 1. From Table II , we can obtain the following properties. 1)
D. Application Results
is stable for Player 1 if a) Player 1 prefers to and , and b) Player 2 can improve its payoff from by changing its option from (using other power generation means) to (adding hydropower generation in other reservoir) or (upgrading the dam) and Player 1 prefers to the resulting state ( or ) (b-1) or Player 2 prefers or to (b-2). If is stable for Player 1, (a) and (b-1) or (a) and (b-2) must be satisfied.
2) is stable for Player 2 if Player 2 prefers to or (c), and Player 2 prefers to or (d), Player 2 prefers to or (e-1) or Player 1 prefers or to or (e-2). If is stable for Player 2, (c) and (d) , (c) and (e-1) , or (c) and (e-2) must be satisfied.
Sequential stability needs player's ability to forecast counterpart's sanction. In order to lead players to the stable state, the planning authority needs not only to inspect players' preferences, but also to hold the information jointly with players. That is, specified preference order should be made common knowledge.
E. Case With More Information
Now we assume another situation where the planning authority can obtain additional information on players' preference. In this case, the number of conditions included in sufficient condition sets can be reduced. Table III shows sufficient condition sets for s stability with following additional information. 1) Player 1 prefers arbitrary cooperative solution (reservoir renewal) to both the status quo and the noncooperative solution and (33)
2) Player 2 always prefers the structural measure (using other power generation means) to (adding hydropower generation in another reservoir) and prefers (upgrading the dam) to and (34)
In this case, is the second largest payment for Player 1 and is the second preferred alternative for Player 2.
can be regarded as the compromising alternative. Table III shows that s stability depends on the tradeoffs of both players' preference between structural alternatives and payment. That is, the critical conditions for stability are that both players prefer to .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the application of robustness analysis to the conflicts where the information on players' preferences is incomplete. Robustness analysis is generalized to apply the situation where preferences of both players are not known by the third party. Then, the methodology was applied to the planning conflict between two players representing hydropower generation and river environment.
If the third party has only incomplete information on preferences of stakeholders, it is necessary to use a different methodology for coordination, which is different from one where complete information is available. The robustness analysis can become a useful approach to detect the stable and better alternatives. 
